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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the Experimental Housing
Allowance Program (EHAP). My focus is on what the experimental data have
taught us that could not have been learned from more traditional sources
of information. I review the major problems that confronted investigators
using non—experimental data, and for each problem discuss whether or not
it was mitigated by the availability of EHAPdata.I conclude that if
the goal was to obtain improved estimates of the behavioral response to
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(609) 452—4022I.Introduction
Inthe UnitedStatesandnanvothercountries, attempts havebeen
made to augment the rea] incomes of the poor by increasing theircon-
sumption of housing. Such schemes have taken a number offorms;for
examole,provision of public housing, construction subsidies, etc. It
has been suggested that a better method would be to givepoor people
financial allowances which could be used to upgrade their housing stand-
ards. The success of such a program would depend upon the answers to
several questions. Two of the most important are: Would low income
families respond to financial incentives to increase their housing con-
sumption? To the extent they do, would housing prices simply be driven
up, resulting in windfall gains for landlords?
To obtain answers to these important questions, in 1970 the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development authorized a social excerimont,
The Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP). The first part of
EHAP, the "demand experiment" was designed to predict households' re-
sponses to housing allowances. In this experiment members of a random
sample of low income households were granted housing allowances and.
theirbehavior compared to a control group without allowances. The
secondpart, the "supply experiment" was designed to examine markot ef-
fects of ucusing allowances. All low income families in two communities
were eligible to receive allowances, and. the response of the overall
level of prices in each community was carefully monitored. (The pro-
cisc provisions of the programs are discussed in greater detail below.)— n —
E&Ptasnot instituted in an intellectualvacuum. For years prior
tothe cx;uri:.tent, housing rr.Ls :cciv..d c(tzicitrableattcatiorz frct't
economists. The 9urpose of thispaper is to discuss what ncw insights
EllA? has provided concerig proktbleresponses to various typc-s of
housingallowances.Sttcificafly, I intend to focus on what experinental
datahave taught us about theseresponses that could not have been learned
from more traditional sources. This isadmittedly a narrow ,bccause
E}IAP produced a number of "...serendipitousfindings that had nothing to
do with the research objectives used tojustify them"(Aaron,1979, p.43).
Forexample, much of value appears to have been learnedconcerning effic-
ient techniques for administering welfareprograms. Nevertheless, the
predictionof behavioral responses lies at the heatof EHAP, and it is
fundamentally on the basis of new knowledge about themthat the experi-
ment must be judged.
The existence of numerous studies whichhave used conventional data
toanswer questions similar to those studied in EHAPsuggestsa natural
wayto organize this paper. I will reviewthe major problems that con-
fronted previous investigators, and foreach problem discuss whether or
not it has been mitigated by theavailability of experimental data. I
should emphasizethat it isnot icy intention to suggest thattheEHAP in-
vestigatorswereunaware of the fact that for some problems,experimental
observationsoffer no particular advantage. Rather, theirwork has shown
keen s.ansitivity to thQ liaitations of theirdata.
Thedtanand excriInntIs discusted in Section II,su'ply in Section
III.Section IV contains the conclusions.- - rvyS
II. The Demand_Experiment
Themain purpose of the dcmanJ cxpernents was toobtain odicLi•:ns
of households' resnonses to various types of housing allowances. I begin
this section by describinc theexS:eriment' s structure.This is followed
by adiscussion of problems that users of conventional data hove faced
in analyzing housing behavior, and the extent to which experimental data
alleviate these problems.
2
A.DescriptIon of the Demand Experiment
In the demand experiment, a set of randomly selected low income
households received allowances, while mcmbers of a control group did not.
There were two basic types of allowances. Under the first, the payment
received was the difference between the cost of 'adequate"housing estab—
lished for the program (C) and some fraction b of householdincome3
(Y)
(1) M =C—bY
where M is the size of the payment. (Cwas determined by a panel of
housing experts, which considered both household size and the sitein
making its decision.) Equation (1) is referred to as the "housing gap
formula." Under the second scheme, known as the "percent ofrent
formula," the payment was some fraction ()ofthe gross rent )
paidby the family:
M =CiREssentia].lv, the demand experiment consisted of confronting dif—
ferentfonilies with varici;]us of ,b , C,andthen com-
paring theirhousing decisions to those of thecontrol oroup.In
addition, some of te nousing gap nousenolas were tolo thattheir apart-
mentshad to satisfy certain minimui standards beforetheywould be
eligible for payment. For example, plumbing and kitchen facilities
had to meet certain specifications; roofs, ceilings and wallshad to
be in good repair, etc.(Friedman and Weinberg 1978, p. A-3l
In practica,value3 for b of 0.15, 0.25, and 0.35were employed;
the parameter o. took on values that started at 0.2 andwere increment-
ed by 0.1 until they reached 0.6.C varied between 20% below and 20%
above the levels set by the experts. The experimentwas conducted for
three years beginning in 1973 at two sites, Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania
4 and Phoenix, Arizona. At each site about one thousand low income
families participated in the experiment, somewhat underhalf of which
were included in the control group. Only renters were eligible.
B. Problems in Predicting the Demand Pesponse to Housing Allowances
Presumably, by appropriately comparing the responses of the control
and treatment groups, one can infer the impact of the varioustypes of
allowances upon h'using behavIor. However, suppose for the moment that
experimentaldata were not available, and aninvestigator were asked to
predictthe. effect thot allowances would hoveupon }ousing behnv4or.—3
fastlikely the investigator would begin by noting that thehoucig gap
formula is ese'ntiaily an ncrease in ricome, and theercent ci rent
formula Inpresents a chance in the price of housing servicesfrom some
price P to (l—n)P .Thereforegiven income and price elasticities of
housing demand, one can uredict an individual'sresponse to the housing
allowances.0These considerations suggest thefollowing strategy: employ
multiple regression techniques (or some variantthereof) to estimate the
demandfor housingservices,employing either cross-sectional or time
series data. This yields a set of the relevantelasticities. Then, as—
suisincj that people would react to the price and incomedifferences gener-
ated by a housing allowance program in thesame way as those generated
"naturally," use the elasticities to estimate theprogram's
impact on housing demand.
I now discuss some problems that face theinvestigator who wants
to implement this strategy, and whether or not theproblems are eliminat-
ed when experimental data are available.
1. Specification of a Model
Users of conventional data typically begin by specifying a model
that relates the quantity of housing services demanded for the 1th ob-
servation (Q), tosome function f(S) of price(P.) ,income(Y.)
and a 'ector of demographic variables Zthattheoretical considera-
tionssuggest might be reevant:
=f(P.,Y.,Z.) (3 1 1 11—6-
In Some casesf()isslecified in an ad hoc butconvenient form such
aslog-linear (e.g., Polinaky and Eliwood 11979]
,Rosenf1979bJ ,while
other times it is derive2 from maximization ofan explicit utility func-
tion(Abbott and Ashenfelter [1976])
Equation (3) is deterministic, so the next step is toassume that
even observations with identical right hand side variablesmay have dif-
ferent because of random errors. Usually, anerror term is ap-
pended additively.(For an exception see King [1980).)Now, given a
set of observations on Q.'' andZ. and the stochastic speci-
fication, the model's parameters can be estimatedusing a variety of
econometric techniques. The parameter estirriatescan then be used to
compute behavioral elasticities;6 indeed, in thecase of log linear
demand curves, the parameter values themselvesare the elasticit15
There are several major drawbacks with this standardprocedure.
First, economic theory puts very few constraints on the form off(•)
so the investigator must make an essentially ad hoc choicewith respect
to the specification of either the demandor utility function. Second,
it must be assumed that f() is identicalacross individuals.7 (When
time series data are used, the analogousassumption is that f() does
not change over time.) Finally, and perhapsmost crucially, itmust be
assumedthat the fit(ed relationship will continue toapply when a right
hand side variable for a given observationchanges, For example, if the
investigator finds that is less than one, it does not imply that
increasingaparticularfamily' sincometenpercent will increaseits
housingconsumptionby a smallerpercentage. Allthat one has really
learned isthatinthedata, poorerfamiliesdevoUe a larger frt on oftheir income to housing than richer families, ceteris oaribus.Only by
assumt that poor families would act lika the richeronesif their in--
comeswere increased, and vice versa,can one give any behavioral signi--
ficanceto elasticity estimates from regressions.
In contrast, the situation facing the investigator with experimental
dataappearssimple. There is no need to specify f(),orto make pos-
sibly invalid behavioral assumptions. As Hausman and Wise [1981]note,
provided that the experiment is designed properly, all that isnecessary
is to compare the behavior of individuals in different treatmentgroups
with each other, and with the control group. Indeed, EHAP investigators
Friedman and Weinberg [1978] do exactly this. In a series of tables
they exhibit information on housing expenditures forboth the experi-
mental and control groups at the time of enrollmentand at two years
after enrollment.cSee, for example, pages 8, 13, 14, A—54, A—55.)
Interestingly, however, only a small portion of Friedman andWeinberg's
lengthy (and excellent)9 report on the demandexperiment is devoted to
discussion of such results. Most of the documentconcerns the specifi-
cation of models like (3), and their estimationwith data from the ex-
periment. But as Hanush-ek and Quiyley 11979h] observe,such 'reoression
estimates ...donot arise from experimental payments ofincome, but
rather from the 'natural' experimentarising because 'otherwise identi-
cal' households of (e.g.] varying incomeare observed to have made dif-
ferentchoices"(p. 20).lnshort, the experimentalnature of thedata
is ignored, so that all the model spccificatjonproblems associated with
converitiona] data must be confronted.-8—
Why is this the case? The main rcason, I think, is the possibility
that sco of the key pararote-sthe t onvernhou-ing 1:--:avior dcoJ opon
variables that can change over time. For example,tiereiscooc evidence
thatthe price elasticity o denanl for housing is a function of income
(Rosen11979aJ). Thus, to the extent the economic environment changes,
the value of simple comparisons between control and experimentalgroups
will be diminished.10 In contrast, a properly estimatedstructural model
would allow an investigator to deal with such a situation.
Additional reasons are provided by Stafford's (1981] discussionof
the general circumstances under which experiment-i resultsare likely to
be more useful than those from structural models.First, there must he
reasonable certainty that the programs examined in theexpericnt are
the ones which will eventually be considered bypolicy makers. This is
because by its nature, an experiment can generate informationonly about
the specific treatments being examined (or interpolationsbetweenthem).
Second,there must be some agreement on the relevant time horizon.Other-
wise the experiment may not be long enough forone to observe all its ef-
fects upon the population.
The application of Stafford's criteria suggests that in thecase of
housing allowances, a structural approach is required. A multitude of
housing programs have been considored in the past (see Aaron [1972])
there is no reason to believe that society has settled intoa consensus
on the particular programs and parameters studied in EHAP.Furthermore,
'Ising decisions are evidently made byfamilieswithin a long runframe—
f-k, hut the irecise amount of time required is not known. As noted in—9—
Section 5,below,the problem ofestimatinglag lengths is notcaav in
structural models, hut at least sortie interestingresults have been oh—
tamed.
For all these reasons, itisalmost inevitable tnat Fried-ranand
Weinberg, as well as other investIgators using the experimental data,11
eventually turn to models of the kind used in the analysis of conventional
data. Of course, it may be the case that there are otherfeatures of ex-
perimental data that make them especially useful, an issue to be discussed
below. But in an area like housing, they do not relieveinvestigators
of the burden of constructing theoretical and statisticalmodels.
2.Definitionof Holsing Services
Given that analyses of both experimental and conventional data re-
quire the construction of models, the important question becomes wnether
or not the experirrertal data better facilitate their i.mplementation. Con-
sider, for example, the problem of making operational the left hand side
variable of the equation, "housing services." Housing is intrinsically
a multidimensional commodity --adwelling is characterized by its number
ofrooms, their size, the quality of construction and plumbing, etc. It
is therefore very difficult to summarize in a single number thequanti--
tyofhousing services generated by a given dwelling.Usually t
isassumed that the amount of housing services 5proportional to the
rent paid, or, in the case of anowner—occupied dwelling, to the value
of the house.(See, e.g., Polinsky andEllwood[l979]. Thedifficulty- 10—
hereis that the rental value of a dwclling at a given timemay reflect
characceristics of the market that have nothing to do with the euar.tity
of housing services actually generated. As King [1980] pointsout, for
example, the special income tax treatment of rental income will general-
ly influence market values.
An alternative tack would he to abandon the possibility of sunanar-
.izing housing services i.i a single variable, and instead to estimate a
series of demand functions for various housing attributes. An ianiediate
problem is the absence of observable market prices for attributes.Recently,
Witte, et. al [1979] have implemented, thesuggestion of Rosen [1974] that attri-
bute demand equations be estimated in a twostep process: (1) estimate the implicit
attributeprices from an hedonic price equatiorJ2 for housing, and (2)
use these prices as explanatory variables in regressions with attribute
quantities as the dependent variables. However, Brown and Rosen [1980]
have shown that major statistical pitfalls are present in thisprocedure,
and that the validity of Witte, etal's results is therefore in question.
Although some progress is being made in dealing with these problems (see
Quigley [1980]), the approach that continues to predominate is the use of
rent as the single measure of the quantity of housing services.
Do the EHAP data allow the construction ofmore meaningful measures
of housing services? The simple answer isno. Friedman and Weinberg
[1978],forexample, struggle with the problem of measuringhousingser-
vices1°verymuch the same way as users of non-experimental data(pp. 92—
94). Similarly, Hanusk anP Quigley's [l979a]analysis of EJIAP data
uses housing expenditures as the dependent variable in thedemand equations.
Experimental data do not remove thisimportantstumbling b1oc.11 — — .LJ
3.Priceof kousing kervices
Imagine an irLvec ti g tor with(nonexperimcijta1)cross—sectional obser-
vations on a •stup of re torsallof whom coma froma aarticuIr comr-onity.
If the housingmarket jEcompetitive, ii:seemsreasonable to assume that all
individuals face thesameprice of housing services. However, in theahoence
of anyarice variation, it is impossible toestimate the price elasticity of
demand. investigators with conventionaldata therefore often ana3yze ohscr-•
vations across cities. Ofcourse, the problem of measuring inter—city hous-
ing price variation still remains.Becausa the price of housing services
is housing expenditures divided by thequantity of housing services, the
above noted difficulties in measuring thelatter are bound to create prob-
lems in measuring price. Several possibleSolutions are found in the litera-
ture. A popular arproach is to estimatehedonic rice equations for dif-
ferent cities, an usa them as the basesfor a housing price index. However,
Alexander 11975] has pointed out severalproblems with this approach. One
of the most important is that the selectionof a set of attributes to be
includedin the hedonic price index must bedecided on ad hoc grounds, but
thesubstantive implications of the estimatesoften depend upon the choice
made.
Theuser of EHAP data has an advantage indealing with the problem
of measuring price diffcrence:sacross observations. Recall that ina
community the effective price ofhou$ing facing the individual, P,
(4)
F.(l-n)p 1 ao
where is the pre—trearentDrice of housing,and is the HP
subsidy rate (equal to zero for membersof the control group). Because— 12
ofthevariance generated in P.by theC;., thefact thatP
identical across individuals in the community no longer precludes estima—
tion of a priceressonse, Pcanbe normalized at an arbitraryvaiLle
andthen(4) used as the price term. This approach is used by Friedman
and Weinberg[1978],and Hanuskek and Quigley 11980].
Apotential problm is the possibility that the before-treatment
price of rental housing may not be constant within a city. Polinsky and
Eliwood [1979, p. 199] show that even if the market is comcetitive, vari-
ation in land prices s.ithin the community will lead to differences in the
13
price of housing services.However, Hanuskek and Quigley [1980]
argue convincingly that such differences in P0 are unlikely to be of
much imortance in the EHAP samples. It seems safe to conclude, then,
that the eoerirnental data confer distinct benefits in estimating the
price elasticity of demand for rental housing.14 Ironically, the price
elasticity per se is unlikely to be of much use in designing a housing
allowance program. A percent of rent formula offers such attractive
opportunitiesfor mutually beneficialfraud on the part of landlords
andrenters that is hard to imagine itever being implemented.
4.Shift_Variables
Consider now the shift (i.e. ,non-price) variables of equation (3)
Standard theoretical considerations suggest that for income, Y ,a
permanent rather than annual measure should beused. Previous investi-
forh.svedealtwith he prohern of computing porrnanot income in
varius ways. Carliner 11.973] and Rosen [1979a],analyzinglongitudinal— 13—
data,take an average of several year 'sworth of annual income. Polinsky
and Eliwood[1979], using Federal Housing Administration (F1i) data, as-
sumethat the FH.A's estimateof "effective income isa proxy for Derrna—
nent income. Struyk [1976] uses the fitted value of a roaression of in-
comeana set of personal characteristics as his permanent income measure.
Turning now tothe vector Z of other shiftvariables, note that
investigatorswith conventional data have to make arbitrary decisions with
respect to which ones to choose, their measurement, and how they interact
with the other variables. Typical candidates for inclusion are race, sex
of head of household, age, numer of children, etc.
In an experimental framework, proper randomization removes the need
for specifying the shift variables (Hausman and Wise [1981]). However,
to the extent that structural models are required to obtain useful re—
suits (see Section 13.1 above), users of EHAP data are at no particular
advantage whenitcomes to choosing shift variables, and defining them
appropriately. For example, Friedman and Weinberg's permanent income
measure (p. 54) is constructed using the same kind of averaging discus—
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sed above. Similarly, their selection of demooraphic variables is made
on an ad hoc basis (p. 81).
5. Disequilibrium
Most of the studies using cross—sectional data to examine housing
17
demand iplicit1y or explicitly assume that all agents are inequilibrium.
Were this not the case, then a regression of housing services on price,
income, and demographic variables could not be interoreted as a demand
couation.Onthe other hand, analyses oflongitudinaland timeseries
dataoften allow for the possibility that at a given point in time, houce—-- 14—
hoadsmay not be at theIrlongrun equilibrium positions beca;o adjust—
montcosts make it prohibitively expensive to respond immediatelyto
changes in economic environment. It is usually assu:.ed that eu:h a dis--
equilibrium iseliminated over time as householdsmove qradualJyto their
equilibriumpositions18 (e.g., Rosen and Rosen [1980]).It•;wcll—knoe-n
thatsuch models lack a strong choice-theoretic foundation, but a tract-
able alternative is lacking.
Theequilibrium assumption is just as crucial to the analysis of EHAP
data as to conventional data. Even simple comparisons of the behavior of
the control and treatment groups are less meaningful unless both groups
are observed in equilibrium positions. It is for this reason that Friedman
and Weinberg [1978, p. 71] devote a considerable amount of time to separate
analysis of those households which changed dwelling during the course of
the experiment --moversare assumed more likely to be in equilibrium than
stayers.(This, however, creates an important self selection problem which
is discussed in the next section.)
In addition, Friedman and Weinberg utilize the typical partial adjust-
10 mentmodel to study dynamic behavior. They find rather rapid adjustments
in housing behavior (p. 125) .Hanushekand Quigley [1979a] present an in-
novative method to estimate adjustment lags in the EHAP data; but their
technique could just as well have beerL implemented using a convc•ntional
set of longitudinal data. Contrary to Friedman and Weinberg, they find
rather sluggish adjustments: only about one-fifth to one—third of the gap
between desired and actual housing consumption is closcd in each year.
One aspect of the EHPP makes proper modelling of disequilibria especial-
ly imoortant. 'or some treatment groups, individuals were ineligible for
housingallowances unless theirhousing met certain quality stenderd. (See-
SectionII .A, ae3v.)Inother words, indiidaj5 wrecoristrainei to con—
sujne minimumaoount of certain housinq attributes. To the extcn that any
of theseconstraintswerebinding,thendenandfunctions for otbr
attributesof the housing bundle would depend not only onpricesof the
attributes,butthe quantitiesof theconstrained attrihc.os. Estin:-
tionof attribute demand functionsin thepresence of quantity constraints
is clearly a complicated matter. Unfortunately, given thepaucity of
work on estimating attribute demands in the relatively simole unconstrain-
ed case (see Section II.B.2 above), one cannot expect that themore compli-
cated disequilibrium problem will be solved soon. Such workmay provide an
interesting use for EHAP data in the future.
6. Selectivity Bias
In recent years econometricians have devoted a substantial amount
of effort to the study of statistical problems that arise when thesample
used in a regression analysis is non—random (see Heckman l979].) It has
been shown that if selection into a sample is non—random, then unlesscer-
tain corrective measures are taken, parameter estimatesmay be inconsistent.
For example, it is common to estimate separate demand ecscations for renters
and homeowners. However, since individuals self—select into their tenure
modes, the sample selection process is not random, and inconsistent coef-
ficients may result.(Rosen [1979a].) Similarly, if separateregressions
are estimated for aovcrs and stayers, sample selection bias is a threat.
AsFriedman a d einbcrg11979, p.130] point out, althougha random
sampleof low—income households was offered enrollment in thePercentof
Rent plans, the demand functions wereest.mated from a ncr—rcnor- schsample;
viz., ..housoholdsthat accepted the enrollment offer, were verified to— 16—
bewithin the income eligibility limit, remained intheexperiment, and
moved sometime between enrollment and two years after enrollment.' Each
of these criteria introduces the possibility of sample selection bias.
Ofcourse, users of EHAPdata can take advantage of various statistical
techniquesto cietermine whether or not selectivity bias is present, arid
if so, to correct for it (Hausman and Wise £1981]). In experimental data,
then, selectivity bias is not eliminated ——itmerely appears in new forms.
7.Participation in, and Percection of, the Proaram
To predict the aggregate response to a housing allowance progra:i,
one needs to know the nurber of eligible families, and the proportion
of those who would choose to participate. Presumably at least rough in-
formation on the first item could be obtained from census or similar
figures on the income distribution. It is hard to imagine how non-experi-
mental data could be used to illuminate the participation issue. Although
some conventional data sets have information on participation rates in
existing welfare procrams (e.g., foodstamps), probably one cannot reliably
infer from them what the patterns of participation in a quite different
program would be.
A related question concerns individuals' perceptions of the program.
In order to use results from conventional data to predict the effect of
housing allowances, one must first of all assume that people would under-
stand the program. Furthermore, it must be assumed that percent-of—rent and
(unconstrained) housing gap payments are perceived as equivalent to price arid incore
changes,respectively. Although one can test for rational cerception of— 17
the provisions of existing welfare programs (e.g.,williams Ii975)
thereisno reason necessarily to expect such results to carry over to
the housingallowances case.
withrespect to both the participation and perceotion cuesticns,
the experinental data proido interesting insights, but no defn:te con-
clusions.Clearly, EHAP investigators can observe whether or notindivi-
duals participate in the experiment, and correlate participation with
various economic and demograrhic variables. The main problem is that the
results may be affected by the individuals' knowledge that they are involved
in an experiment, the "Hawthorne effect." To the extent that people act
differently when they know that their behavior is being observed as part
of an experiment, it will confound attempts to predict participation under
a universal regime An additional difficulty is that participation rates
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may be affected by the knowledge that the program is only, temporary.
Friedmanarid. Weinberg11978] attempted direct investigation of the
perceptionissue. Fa nilies in the percent of rent experiments were asked
inwhat direction their housing allowances would move if their rent were
increased by $10. Only about a half understood that their allowance would
increase. However, when separate demand functions for both those who
understood and those who did not were estimated, the hypothesis that their
parameters were the same could not be rejected. Friedman and Weinberg
[1979, p. 139] conclude that, even for the people who answered thequestion
incorrectly,
"... theirresponse to the allowance payment can be analyzed
as i theyunderstocd."—18--
A more convincing test ould have henri possible if therewore van--
ation in the pro—treatment rce of housing services.Suppose that the
effective Price P appears in logarithmic form on the right hand side
of the demand equation.'ote that
nP. =n(l-a.)+ nP 1 1 01
where P. is the pre—reatment price and o.is as defined above.
Thus,if 2n(l-c.) an 9nP, areenteredseparately into the reqres-
sion, a natural wayto confirm correct perception is to test whether or
nottheir coefficients areequal. Equality would suggest that individuals
perceivetreatment induced changes in price the same wayasthose Tlnaturalivu
induced. The advantage of such a test is that it does not rely on a direct
question addressed to the participants. Unfortunately, as noted in Section
II.B.3 above, in the EHAP samples there is probably not enough variation in
the pre-treatrnent prices to make an attempt to calculate them worthwhile.
Another way toexaminethe perception issue wouldbeto compare param-
eter estimates of structural models generated by data from different programs
inthe experiment (and the control 9roup) .Ifselection into the various
groups were random, and if individuals perceive program parameters correctly,
then the underlying behavioral parameters should be about the same. Of course,
tothe extent that the particular specification of the structural model in-
fluences the results, they are rendered incbnclusive.— 19
115. Sienul" Exernc:nt
Inmost analyses of housing demand using bothconventionalcross-
sectional and EPPdata,itisassumed that the yre-treatment crice of
housingis constant. In effect, each household faces a cerfeotlv slastic
supplyof housino services. From an econometric point of view, this
assumption is justified, because each household is sufficiently small
22
to be regarded as a price taker.However, sole reliance on such do—
mandestimates to predict the overall behavioral response to housing
allowances is potentially hazardous. If a considarable number of
program participants increase their demand for housing services, then
to the extent the supply of housing services to the community slopes
upward, the pre—treatment price will rise.
Considerations such as these led, to the so-called Supply Experiment.
In two communities, all individuals who met certain income qualifications
were made eligible for housing allowances. The idea was to see whether
or not the allowances would induce increases in prices or any other impor—
tant disruptions in the housing market
In this Section I begin by summarizing the provisions of the supply
experiment, and then, as before, discuss whether or not EHAP data provide
substantialimprovement over those from conventional sources,Asmight
heexpected, many of the issues that were important on the demand side are
alsopresent here. Such issues therefore receive only cursory discussion.— 20—
A.Description of the Supoly_Exnerinon
The supply experiment began in 1973—74, with a planned duration of
10years. In the two sites chosen, Green say, Nisconsin and Scuth lend,
Indiana, enrollment in the procrari was open to every eligible nouSenold.
All payments were made according to the "housing gap formula" (ecuation
(1)),with b ,theimolicit tax rate on income, set at 25. Inorderto
qualify for the payments, housing had to meet certain minimum standards.
Unlike the demand experiment, homeowners as well as renters were allowed
to participate. Perhaps the key methodological difference between the de-
mand and supply experiments is that for the latter, there was no control
group.
After four years of observation at both sites, it became clear that
"The experimental progra:l ...hadvirtually no effect on housing prices,
either marketwiae or in the market sectors most heavily populated by
program participants' (Earnett and Lowry 11979, p. 1].) There eie two
principal explanations for this phenomenon:(a) Because the income
elasticity of demand for housing services apparently is quite lowfor program
25
participants, (about 0.3 for renters, according to I4ulford [1979,
p. 31]) the housing allowances did not shift the market demand curve
very much, and (b) The demand changes that did take place were spread
ut over time due to adjustment lags. Since both of these phenomena were ob-
served in the demand experiment, some critics [Brookings, 1979] have argued thatthe
supply experiment should not have commenced until the demandresults_wera.in.
overthe1ess,it is usefulto assess the benefits that the availability
26
Cfexperimentaldata will confer upon future researchers of housing
sur)rly.21 —
B.Problems in_Predicting the Su:1yResponse
to Housing T-dlcances
1.Snecfcation of a Model
Investigators whowadtto estimate housing SUiY functio:s geocrel—
ly begin by trying to use economic theory tospecify an estimable model.
Apopular approach is to assume some housing production function,estimate
its paramete,and use them to infer the shape of the suoplyfunction'
For example, Ingram and Orun [1977] asme that housing services are a
constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.) function of "quality capital"
and "operation inputs" (p. 284). Polinsky and Eliwood (1979] also posit
aC.E.S.production function, but assume that its arguments are land and
capital. Field tundate] uses a transcendental logarithm productionfunc-
tion with three inputs, land, capital and labor. Poterba 11980] eschews
selection of a specific form for the production function, and instead
starts by postulatiric a supply function that is log linear in the price
ofhousing, input costs, and credit availability (p. 10).COf course, duality
considerations suggest that one can work backward from the supply cu:c'.'e to the
-underlying production function.)
The specification of the underlying technology can sometimes pre-
determine substantive results. For example, since Eliwood and PolinskyIp79]
assume constant returns to scale (p. 201) the iriplied long run scpply
curve of housing services is perfectly elastic, regardless of parameter
estimates?8Postulating sucha techno].cgy then, guaroritec che result
thathousing allowances will have no effect on the pre—treatment price— 22--
ofhousing, at least as long as in:utpricesremain unchanged. The in-
terestingquestions thenbecomebowhighdo prices rise in the short run,
and how much time is required to reach long run equi1ibriup?These is-
sues are discussed belowinthesectionon dynamics; theyarertioned
hereto emphasize once again the importance that modelspecification plays
in analyses of conventional data.
Thepresence ofthe supply "experimental' data doesnot remove the
necessityfor some kind of modelling,particularly since there is no
control group. Barnett 11979], for example, providessome simple
comparisons of the increase in rents in thetest sites relative to those
in other U.S. cities (.13).Even such relatively straightforwardcompari-
sons, however, require an implicit model of thedeterminants of housing
costs, so that 'other' costs can be Subtractedout to find the 'pure
housing allowance effect. Rydell 11979]constructs a rather involved model
of monopolistic competition inhousing markets in order to assess the
market impact of allowances. He simulatesthe model with experimental
data, but this could have been done justas well with numbers from conven-
tional sources.-- 23-
2 , 3Defining Housnq Services and Their Price
The problems in defining housing services and tneir price are of
course as central to supply as demand. Those studying the supply c
housing with conventional data have made exactly the same sort of as-
sumptions in constructing teir price and quantity variables; see
Poterba [1980], Ingram and Cron11977] or Rothenberg11977]
Inthis regard, the numbersgeneratedby the supply experiment arc no
better than conventional data. Indeed, the difficulties associated
with the multidimensional nature of housing are particularly vexing
here, because one of HAP's mandates was to find out what combination
of rehabilitation of existing units, construction of new units, and irn—
provement of neighborhocd quality would be induced by houing allowances
(Allen, at. al, [1979, p. 141). To answer this question, one would need
toquantify these attributes, compute their implicit prices, and then es-
timate supply curves or each. As noted above, researchers have still
not solved completely the problems associated with estimating demand and
supply schedules for characteristics, and nothing about experimental data
per se makes this task any elsier.
4. Shift Variables
In a cornpetit3.ve model, the supply of housing services depends not
only upon their orn price, hut upon inpuL prices as well, so thee are
important shift variables. Housing studies using conventional
data faceserious difficulties inobtainingoperational measures
ofhousing input ccst. For example, Poterba [1980] usos the Poeckh
indexof the price of inputsfor a new one family structure to— 24—
measureconstruction costs. Although this is a comonlv used index, it.
is well—known that it is deficient because fixed weights arcusedin its
connotation. Inoram and Oran ld17j use the fuel component of the can-
sumei-'sprice index to account for the price of all onerating inputs, nut
as Rothenbcrg [1977]pointsout,it is not clear thatthis iricko cantures
all the needed information.
With respect to measuring the prices of housing inputs the experi-
mental data provide no particular advantage. For example, Rydell [1979,
p. 36] must make calculations regarding the costs of components of gross
rent similar to those who use conventional data. It should be noted, however,
that these appear to be some of the most careful computations available.
5,6 Disequilibrium and DynamicIssues
As suggested above, many models of housing supply begin withapro-
duction function which exhibits constant returns to scale in the inputs.
Given this specification, and assuming constant input prices,the long run
supply of housing services is infinitely elastic. Thus, anydemandshift
induced byahousing allowance will leave unchanged the long run price of
housing services. Fowever, the question of supply response is still in-
teresting, because the production function does not indicate the length
oftime required to reach long run equilibrium, or the pathofprices
during the transition. To understand the supply response, t is
crucial to model noth the process of adjustment to the newequilibrium,
andthe presence cf anyfactorswhich might impede themarketfrom achiev-
ing equilibrium.
Thus, for axample, in one of their models Ingram and Oron 11977, p.
292] assume tba the most a landlord can investeachperiod ilimited to—25-
theamount of cash generated by the existing investment, even if this is
insufficient to close the qapbet eonthe desired and actual :riosing
stock. Poterba 11980] argues that conditions in the credit marketmay
affectthe supply of housing, and he proxies these by the flow of savings
deposits received by savings and loan associations. Poterba also assumes
adelayed supply response to changes in all right hand side variables,
which are entered in polynomial distributed lags (p. 10).
The designers of the supply experiment clearly were aware of the
importanceof lags in the housing supply process, as witnessed by the
fact that the experiment was given a ten year duration(although only
fiveyears worth of data were collected). Because there was no control
group, however, there are no simple comparisons that one can make in
order to learn how movements toward the final equilihriinrt take place.
My guess is that even if there had been a control group (call it '8outh
Bend Prime"), structural models would still be more useful than experimen-
tal comparisons for determining the lag structure. By the time a decade
had lapsed, it is quite possible that a number of variables whicn in-
fluence adjustment patterns would have changed,so comparisons of south
Ber and "South Bend Prime" would not beveryinformative.
7.Market Environment
In the demand experiment it was unnecessary to study market environ—
ment,sincethe key question was how micro unitsreactedto exogenous
changesin their budget constraints. But to understand ovora.JJ effects,
the question of market structure is crucial ——theimpact of thehousing
allowanceson pre-treatment price clearly will depend mutatis mutandis— 26 —
uponthe degree o coupetitiveness in the market, the amount
of slack existing when the program is initiated, theextento:E housing
marketsegmentation, etc.
The standard assumption is that competition prevails. As de Leeuw
aridStruyk [1975] and Poterha [1980] note, however, even given comoetition,
complications arise because two markets have to be equilibrated by the
price of housing services; the market for existing houses and the market
for new construction• The situation is even more complicated when
one takes into account the multiplicity of tenure modes. Each type of
housing is traded in its own submarket, and each of these (interre1ated)
markets has a market clearing price. If the housing market is non-competi-
tive, the question of supply effects is even more difficult because of the
absence of a generally accepted theory of price determination. Theoreti-
cally, one can imagine examining a group of cities that are identical ex-
cept for housing market structure, and comparing the results whenthey
aresubjected to housing allowances.(Indeed, something of thisnotion
was behind the selection of Green Bay and South Bend as the experimental
sites.)In practice, such a course would be prohibitively expensive,
even if it were possible to find an appropriate group of cities. Again,
construction of structural models appears to be the more viable methodol-
ogy. For example, using data from the supply experiment, Rydeli [1979]
attempts to explain the insensitivity of housing prices to apparent vari-
ationsinmarket tightness byrecourseto a theory of monopolistic compe--
titiori.This is aninterestingapproach, but the availability ef experi-
mentaldata provides ro special advantage when it comes to testing its
va1idi ty.— —
IV.Conclusion
The EJDerirnental Housing Allowance Program has generated a rich and
valuable set of data on the housing behavior of lowerincomeAmericans.
These data anpear to have been analyzed carefully and creativelyby the
EHAPinvestigators, although it is doubtless that their conclusions will
2
be challenged as the numbers are studied by other investigators. The
issue discussed in this paper is the extent to which the experimental
nature of these data per se enhances their vaiue Specifically, are the
problems faced by investigators who have used conventional data to pre-
dict behavioral response to housing allowaices in any way mitigated
by the availability of experimental data?
With the possible exception of experimentally induced variations in
housing prices, it seems that the experimental data offer no particular
advantages. Fundamentally, this is because housing behavior is so complex,
and the policy environment so uncertain, that simple comparisons of experi-
mental and control groups are unlikely to be of much interest. Rather, the
data must be interpreted with the help of theoretical and statistical models.
Thus, if the goal was to obtain new and improved estimates of the behavioral
response to housing allowances, a social experiment was not necessary. The
30
money would have been better spent on augmenting conventional data sources.- 23
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Footnote s
*Iwould like to thank Joseph Friedman, Jerry Hausman, Ed:in Mills,
Mitchell Polinsky and David Wise for useful conversations.
1. A more fundamental question, perhaps, is why housing allo'ances
shouldbe considered at all when direct income transfers would probah1y
be preferable from th point of view of the poor. Wewilltake itas
given, however, that the public policy goal is to increase their welfare
in some manner tied to housing consumption.
2. This sub—section is based upon Allen, etal. [l979 ,especially
pages 28—30.
3. Thedefinition of Tthousehold income" was essentially post tax 'in-
come less a $300 deduction for each worker in the family.
4. For example, in 1973 a Phoenix family withthreeor four members
would be eligible only if its income were less than $8150; for Pittsburgh,
the limit was $6250.
5. This assumes that individuals' choices are unconstrained by quality
standards.
6, For examnic, the nrice elasticity of dnan is whereP
and 2arc(usually) evaluated at their mean vnlne;.— 34 —
7. Note that this need not implythatthe elasticities be identical
acrossindividuals;such will be Lhe case only for the very simple Cobb—
Douglas specification. One can also specify a random coefficients model,
which allows for a distribution of elasticities across peopic. See
Hausmsn and. Wise [i9O]
8. This point is further developed in Mosteller and Nosteller [19791.
9. Friedman and Weinberg of Abt Associates bring together a wealth of
information on the demand experiment: the economic theoip behind it,
sample design issues, statistical analysis of the data, and more. It is
a pity that no similar major report has been issued by the Rand Corpora-
tion for the supply experiment.
10.One can rescue the experimental approach from this criticism by
building income-price interactions into the experimental design. How-
ever, as Hausmnan and Wise [1981] point out, the more treatment groups,
the less convincing are the results, ceteris paibus.
11.See, e.g., Hanushek and Quigley D979a1,Milis and Sullivan 979,
or Hausman ac1 Wise 980.
12.A regression of the prlce of a commodity R on its characteristics
(a vector X )isthe basis of an hedonic price index for the commodity.
The implicit price of the th characteristic is R/X. .SeeRosen
[19741— 35 -
13. If housing services include accessibility to the work placeand
the usual competitive asshmptiOnS ho'd, then thebefore treatment once
of housing services would be constant. But inthis case, thedependent
variable should be housingexpenditures plus conmuting costs. Potealso
thatif owner—occupied housing were being considered (asit 15Iflthesup-
plyexperiment)an additional complication would arise becausethe effec-
tiveprice of housing services depends uponthe individual's marginal
federal income tax rate. See Rosen [l979a]or King '980]
14. However, the value of these benefits islessened to the extent that
the program induced price reductions are perceived astransitory.
15.Of course, neither the necessity of using a permanentincome mea-
sure nor the types of solutions justmentioned are unique to the study of
housing; they appear throughout the literature ontheestimationof demand
functions.
16.An additinnal problem arises becauseit is not clear how to convert
the monthly EHAP payments, which are known tobe temporary, into changes
in permanent income.
17.An important exception is the workof King 98OI, whoconsiders
rationingbetween different tenure modes in theUnitedKingdom.
ie.This differs from the use of the tnm"disequilibrium"in much of
theacrceconoriC 3 iterature, where itrefersto asituation inwhich
markets fail to clear because of someconstraint(s). See,e.g.,Eanro
and Grossman ft9711— 3o—
19.Unfortunately, as Friedman and Wcirberg a978, p. 127 ]ncoo, dynamic
patternsniqhLbeaffected by the limited duration of the exj:crir:iena.
20.Of course, Hawthorne effects canbeused. to brin9 intocucatica tbc
resultscoancrated by all social exuerimonts.
21.Particoation wasorohably also influenced bythe existence of minimum
housingstandards. Some critics of EHAP have claimed greater variation in
these standards would have provided useful information on the extent to
which they influenced participation.See Brooking Intitution [1979,
p. 10].
22.For many homeowners, the federal income tax generates an endogenous
price for housing services.
23.Barnett and Lowry ft979, p. c] discuss some predictions of the
market effects of housing allowances that were made prior to ERA?.
24. This subsection is based upon Allen, et. al. ,[1979],
25. In addition, only about half the eligible renters and 30% of the
eligiblehomeo,mers had enrolled after fouryears(1len, et.ai., [1979,
p.35).
26. Several researchers have used data from the supply experiment to
O5tllCtCdemandfor housing schedulos ,e.g.,1ulfordp.979 .T'ccwiJ I
nothe discussed here.— 37 —
27.Given the production function and input prices, one can dv: the
marginal cost schedule which, under competition, is the sunpl'y cu::v.
28.The assumption of a horizontal supply curve is quite comnori, e ..
seedLeeu and Struyk [1975, p. 15]. Of course, to the e:ent that :n•ut
prices change with the size of the housing industry, the long mn su'Tply
curve will have a non—zero slope.
29.For example, Mills and Sulljvan [1979] have su;gested that problems
with econometric technique lead the EHAP investigators to underestimate
incomeelasticities from the demand experiment.
30.A similar conclusion is reached by Hanushek and Quigley L1979b, p.
68]